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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
S'rATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 8020
Hl~GH

LEOXARD vVOOD, alias
Joseph Earl ~Iartin, alias Joseph
Paul :Martin, alias James Walton,
Defendant and Appella.nt.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATE.\IENT OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged by the State of Utah with
the crimes of Grand Larceny and Being an Habitual
Criminal, the charges being that he, Hugh Leonard Wood,
on or about the 29th day of September, 1952, at the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, stole from Heusted
and Montague, a Corporation, personal property having
a value in excess of $50.00, lawful money of the United
States; and that said Hugh Leonard Wood has been
previously eonvicted of four felonies prior to the 29th
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2
day of September, 1952, as follows, to-wit: Burglary in
the Htate of Oregon, where he was sentenced and committed for 3 years in the Oregon State Penitentiary;
Burglary in the First Degree in the State of ~evada,
where he waH sentenced and committed for 1 to 10 years
in the ~ evada State Penitentiary; Burglary in the First
Degree and Prior Conviction in the State of California,
where he was sentenced and eommitted for 5 years to
life in the California State Prison; Burglary in the
Seeond Degree and Persistent Offender in the State of
Idaho, where he was sentenced and committed for 20
years in the Idaho State Prison.

,.

The appellant was arrested at about noon on the 2nd
day of October, 1952, as he was helping load a footlocker
into a taxicab at the loading entrance to the 'Vilcox
Hotel in Ogden, Utah by detectives Reeder and Butcher;
questioning the taxi driver they learned that there were
t\\·o more footlockers upstairs in room X o. 8, which
Butcher and the taxi driver went up and brought down,
officer Butcher asked the appellant what he was doing
\Yith them and ·appellant stated that he was taking them
to the depot at the request of James O'Neil, an old time
acquaintance, who had requested his baggage, consisting
of three footlockers in room 8 at the said Hotel be
delivered at the depot for shipping. Officer Butcher
claimed that appellant said that the footlocker which
he was helping load into the taxicab belonged to him,
which appellant denied at the trial. The Officers asked
appellant what was in the footlocker, and he said he did
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not know. The officer::-; then told appellant that he was
under arre::-;t, he asked what for, and they told hirn
.. possession of stolen property."
That appellant wa::-; registered at the \Vilcox Hotel,
~-1'10 l(iet'el ~-\xenue, Ogden, Utah and occupied roorn
number one at tirne of his arrest and had occupied said
roorn for the entire uwnth previous to his arrest, that he
never occupied room nurnber 8 at the Hotel and that he
neYer had any of his belongings in room 8 at the Hotel.
The ~tate clairned that the three footlockers taken
frorn the \Yilcox Hotel contained clothing alleged to have
been stolen frorn Heusted and :Montague at Salt Lake
City, rtah on or about September 29, 1952. The only
evidence produced at the trial was that appellant had
rnomentary possession of a footlocker while assisting
cab driver take said footlocker from the Wilcox Hotel to
his cab at the rear of the Hotel, which the State claimed
contained clothing alleged to have been stolen fron1
Heusted and l\Iontague at Salt Lake City. No evidence
was adduced hy the State to prove that appellant ever
had any footlocker or any stolen property in his possession at the Hotel or any other place, excepting as stated,
assisting the cab driver, and appellant denied that he
ever had any footlocker in his possession, except as
stated above, and no eYidenee was adduced to show that
appellant ever knew what was in the footlocker which he
assisted the taxi driYer take to his cab.
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No evidence was given by State at the trial to prove
that appellant was in Salt Lake City on September 29,
1952 and appellant testified that he was not there at
that time and that he had not been there for more than
six months prior to that time, that he did not steal the
property as alleged in the Information and that he did
not have anything to do in stealing said property, and
that he did not know what the footlocker contained which
he assisted taxi driver deliver to his cab.
Appellant contends that considering all the evidence
adduced by the State at the trial, that if appellant should
have been tried on any charge, he should have been tried
for the crime of possession of stolen property in the
District Court of Weber County, Utah.
Appellant and l\Ierl Gall were charged with the crime
of Grand Larceny in a complaint filed in the City Court
of Salt Lake City the first part of October, 1952 and
during that month the Grand Larceny complaint was
dismissed and another complaint was filed in the City
Court of Salt Lake City charging appellant with the
crimes of Grand Larceny and Being an Habitual Criminal, charging appellant with having been previously convicted of four felonies as alleged in the Information.
(R. Tr. 37-121)
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The following is a statement of the errors upon
which the appellant relies for a reversal of the judgments
in this case :
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I
'rhe court erred in denying appellant's n10tion to
quash the Infonnation upon the following grounds:
(1) That it does not charge the defendant with
the comn1ission of an offense.

(2) That the committing magistrate in this cause
did not find that the crimes alleged in the Infornmtion
were ever conuuitted by the defendant for the reason
that no order \Va8 n1ade and signed by him requiring the
defendant to answer in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of rtah to the offenses contained in the
Infonnation.
That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offenses charged or of the person of the
defendant.
( 3)

( 4) That Inore than one offense is charged in the
Information in a manner contrary to the laws of the
State of Utah.

II
The court erred in refusing to grant appellant a
:\Iistrial when during the course of his trial for Grand
Larceny the District Attorney over objections of appellant was permitted to cross-examine him on alleged
felonies contained in the Information wherein appellant
was charged with the crime of Being an Habitual
Criminal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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III
( 1) The court erred in not .sustaining appellant's
motion for dismissal of the action made at the time
the State rested its case on the trial for Grand Larceny.
The motion was made on the grounds of insufficiency of
the evidence introduced by the State and failure of proof
of the allegations contained in the Information.

(:2) The court erred in denying the appellant's
nwtion made at the conclusion of the trial on charge
of Grand Larceny, that the court direct the jury trying
the case to return a verdict of not guilty, for the reason
and upon the grounds that no testimony or evidence was
introduced to prove that appellant did steal, take and
carry any property frmn He us ted and :Jf ontague at Salt
Lake Count~·, l~tah; and for the further reason that if
the claim that possession of recently stolen property
is considered as evidence in this case, then the appellant
contends that a sufficient and proper explanation was
made of that, so that there "·as no evidencB introduced
in this case to prove appellant guilty of Grand Larceny
as charged in the Information. The appellant claiming
that the State had not introduced sufficient evidence to
justify the court in sub1nitting the case to the jury.

IV
Utah's Habitual Criminal Act, Section 76-1-18 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, is unconstitutional and void as
written, construed and applied; being in violation of and
denying appellant's Federal Constitutional right to "Due
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Law" as guaranteed by laws and Constitution
of the ~tate of Utah and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The ~aid Habitual Cri1ninal Statute reads as follows:
.. \Yhoever has been previously twice -convicted of felonies,
sentenced and connnitted to any prison, shall, upon conviction of a felony con1n1itted in this state, . . . . . be
deemed to be an habitual crin1inal, and shall be punished
by imprison1nent in the state prison for not less than
fifteen years. ''
The said Habitual Crin1inal Act is unconstitutional
and void as applied in this case when appellant was
prosecuted for crin1es alleged to have been committed in
~-Hates other than Utah.
The Information and judgment 1n this case shows
that appellant was prosecuted, tried and convicted and
sentenced under the said Utah's Habitual Criminal
Statute on charges of four alleged previous convictions
of purported "felonies" in other states of Oregon, California, Nevada and Idaho.
Prior to 1951 the Habitual Criminal Statute, Section
103-1-18, Utah Code 1943 used the word "crime" which
has a universal legal 1neaning; but the new statute as
revised and re-enacted by Chapter 77 Laws of Utah 1951
used the purely local statutory term "felonies," which
in lTtah as defined h~' statute Utah Code 1953, "A felony
is a crime which is or may be punishable with death, or
h~' impriRomnent in the state prison."
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Under our statutory system of law, there is no such
thing as a universal com1non law felony, in these United
States, the word felony has no legal meaning; therefore
in each and every State its local legal meaning is defined
in various ways by State statutes, and applied in varying
degrees, only to classify those crimes committed within
each State's own Jurisdiction and Borders. And like any
other State statutory creation, has no extraterritorial
force, meaning or effect in other States, or on any acts
committed beyond its borders.
Any alleged offense to be a felony under any Utah
Statute 1nust be a crime within the borders and jurisdiction of, under and against the laws of Utah; any
alleged previous offenses of whatever local name, in
other States and other jurisdictions do not qualify as
felonies under any law of the State of Utah.

v
The court erred in permitting District Attorney
over objections of appellant to force appellant to testify
against himself and to incriminate himself and to furnish
the evidence to convict himself on the untried charge of
Being an Habitual Crinrinal while he was on trial for
Grand Larceny which is contrary to and in violation of
the Habitual Criminal Statute of the State of Utah.

VI
The court erred in denying appellant's Motion in
Arrest of Judgment filed and argued in this cause before
sentence was passed upon him for the verdicts of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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jury upon grounds at' t'tated in said motion, some of the
grounds being, that the court did not have jurisdiction
of the offenses charged in the Inforn1·ation or jurisdiction
of the person of the appellant; that appellant was denied
a fair trial as guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States and the Statutes of the State of Utah for
the reason that he was tried and convicted upon four
alleged and purported felonies in said trial upon which
he had theretofore been found guilty and punished as
provided by law in each of s'aid cases, therefore appellant
was compelled to suffer double jeopardy in said cases
which is contrary to the Statutes of the State of Utah.
VII
The court erred in denying appellant's Motion for
a New Tri'al made upon the grounds of insufficiency of
the evidence adduced by the State to support the verdict
of the jury; and also upon the grounds of errors made
by the court in its instructions to the jury, and errors
made by the court in decisions of questions of law during
the course of the trial and for acts done and allowed by
the court during the course of the trial prejudicialto the
substantial rights of appellant.
VIII
The court erred in ignoring and refusing to make
any pronouncmnent or to enter judgment against appellant for the cri1ne of Grand Larceny or to sentence him
for the rrime of Grand Larceny after the jury returned
):~
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a verdict against appellant of guilty of Grand Larceny,
before he ~sentenced him for the crime of Being An
Habitual Criminal.

PARTICULAR QUESTIONf; INVOLVED
They are as above-stated in the Statement of Errors.
ARGU~lENT

POINT

KU~IBER

I

The defendant filed his ~lotion to Quash the Information in this cause before he had entered his plea to
the Infonnation in the District Court ,,·hich was argued
and by the court denied on January 10, 1953 (Tr. 12).
The court erred in denying defendant'·s motion to quash
on the grounds that the Information did not charge him
with the commission of an offense. The Information did
not allege ownership of property alleged to have been
stolen. In State vs. Jensen, 83 Utah 452, 30 P. 2d 203,
the Court held that "Information which did not allege
ownership of property taken is fatally defective, since
it was necessary in order to charge crime of Larceny to
allege that property belonged to some one other than
defendant.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion to
quash on grounds that committing magistrate did not
find that the crimes alleged in the Information were ever
committed by defendant for the reason that no order was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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made and signed h~, him requiring defendant to answer
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
to the offen8e8 contained in the Information.
Section 77-15-19, Ftah Code 1953, District court
doe~ not require jurisdiction over defendant as a result
of original cmnplaint, but rather from the binding over
of defendant by nmgistrate.

State u-:. Freema,n, 93 Utah 125, 71 P. 2d 196.
That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction
of the offenses charged or of the person of the defendant.
That n1ore than one offense is charged in the Information in a 1nanner contrary to the laws of the State of
Utah (R. Tr. 12).
The last two
this Brief.

statmnent~

are argued elsewhere 1n

POINT NU1fBER II

to

to
not

rer

The court erred in refusing to grant appellant a
:Jlistrial when during the course of his trial for Grand
Larceny the District Attorney over objections of appellant was per1nitted by the court to cross-examine him on
alleged felonies which he was alleged to have committed
and which were contained in the Information, being the
charges filed against appellant in the Infonnation charging hiu1 with BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL (Tr.
123).
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The conduct of the District Attorney was in total
di'sregard of the rights of appellant on trial of the crimes
of Grand Larceny and Being an Habitual Criminal and
in direct violation of the laws of Utah in Criminal Procedure in trials of criminal cases and in direct violation
of Section 76-1-19, Utah Code 1953, Procedure in charging and trying a person <·barged with being an habitual
criminal .... the jury shall not be told of the previous
convictions of felony and the trial on the felony committed within the State of rtah shall proceed as in other
cases.
The jury was so prejudiced by the District Attorney
showing that appellant was guilty of Being an Habitual
Criminal \\'hile on trial on the untried charge of Grand
Larceny that they could not give appellant a fair trial
for the crime of Grand Larceny for which he was on trial
at that time.
The court erred in pennitting District Attorney over
objections of appellant to force appellant to testify
against himself, and to incriminate himself, and to convict himself on the untried crime of Being an Habitual
Criminal while he was on trial for the crime of Grand
Larceny, which is in violation of the laws of the State
of Utah and the Habitual Criminal Statute of Utah (R.
Tr. 121-139).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT NUnfBER III
The n1otions made hy appellant for dismissal of the
action for Grand Larceny when the State rested its case
and that the court direct the jury to return a verdict of
not guilty of Grand Larceny at the eonelusion of the
trial, are being grouped a:-:; practically the same errors
are complained of in both of the 1notions t'ta ted in Statement of Errors Xun1ber III.
'Yhen the State rested its case for Grand Larceny,
appellant nwved the court for a dismissal of the action
upon the grounds that the evidence adduced by the State
was in~ufficient to prove that the crime of Grand Larceny had been cominitted by appellant as alleged in the
Infonnation and Bill of Particulars filed in thi~s action.
The State had not proved that appellant on or about
September 29, 1952 at Salt Lake County, Utah, did steal,
take and carry awa~T frorn Heusted and Montague personal vroperty having a value in excess of $50.
The court erred in denying appellant's motion for
dismissal of the action.
( \Yhere referring to Reporter's Transcript we have
called the same "R. Tr." and refer to rest of file as "Tr.")

at~

There was an absolute "failure of proof" by the
State to connect appellant in any way with the alleged
larcen~T as stated in Information. No evidence was introduced at the trial to show that appellant was in Salt
Lake County at time alleged in the Information- and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appellant testified at trial that he was not in Salt Lake
Count~· at time alleged and that he had not been in Salt
Lake Count~· for more than ~ix months previous to that
time.

It

held in <·a:-:<' of State v. Wh itt'l.IJ, 100 Utah
1-l-, 110 P. 2d :~:17 that in all cases where the presence of
the aeeused i~ nece:-;sar~· to render him responsible, the
:-:tate mu:-~t proYe a:-: a part of its case that he was there,
and if from all the evidence there exists a reasonable
doubt of accused's pre~ence, he should be acquitted.
wa:-;

All the evidence produced at the trial against appellant was that he had m01nentary possession in assisting
cab driver take a footlocker down stairs at the \Yilcox
Hotel, Ogden, T~tah, which State claimed contained some
stolen clothing. Appellant stated that he did not know
what the footlocker contained - no evidence was produced to prove that appellant knew the footlocker contained stolen property. Officers testified that they asked
appellant who the footlocker belonged to, and they stated
that he said it belonged to hiln, which he denied at the
trial and he testified that he told officers he was taking
footlocker to the train depot for James O'Neil who had
occupied room nmnber 8 at the 'Vilcox Hotel, who had
requested that he have it taken to the depot for him (R.
Tr. 116, 117, 118).
The officers informed appellant that he was under
arrest, he asked 'dmt for, and they told him "possession
of stolen property."
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Appellant contend~ that if he was to be prosecuted
and tried for an~· offense, it should have been for pos~e~~inn of ~tolen property, and should have been tried
where found and arrested, in District Court of \Veber
County, rtah.
There never was a single hit of evidence produced
to prove appellant guilty of Grand Larceny in Salt Lake
County a~ alleged in the Information, but the State relied
on that provision in the Larceny Statute to-wit: "pos~e~~ion of propert~· recently stolen, when the person in
po~~e~sion faib to rnake a satisfactory explanation, shall
he deemed prima facie evidence of guilt."
Appellant eontends that that
~tatute i~ uncon~titutional

it compels the

per~on

provi~ion

of the larceny

and void, for the reason that

on trial for larceny to prove his

mnocence.
The

~upreme

Court of the United States rn 1933

under the "Due Process of Law" elause of

~edion

1 of

the 1-!th amendment to the Constitution of the t:"nited
~tates

held: That proof to

an~·

element of a crirninal

eharge, or guilty knowledge thereof cannot be

pre~umed

and the burden of proof cannot be put upon the defendant to
ea~e

di~prove

any element of the crjme. Referring to

of ill orrisson rs. California, 291 U. S. 82-90, 5-l- S. Ct.

:2~1-:2~:1,

wherein the Supreme Court of the United States

held California's Alien Land Law to be unconstitutional.
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The mere adrni~~ion by appellant that the footlocker
belonged to him, which he was assisting cab driver take
down ·stairs of Wilcox Hotel, would not, with the other
evidence adduced at the trial support the conviction for
Grand Larceny. State 1:s. Nichols, lOG Utah 104, 145 P.
2d 802.
Possession of goods recently stolen in connection
with burglar~· doe~ not in itself create a presumption, or
amount to prirna facie proof, that the possesser is guilty
of burglary. After proof that defendant in a prosecution
for burglary accompanied by theft has possession of
stolen goods soon after the crime, he is not required to
show that he obtained the goods "fairly and honestly,"
but if explanation is required it need go no further than
to show that possession wa8 not acquired through complicity in the particular crime of which defendant is
accused.
As the burden of proof in a criminal case can never
shift, an instruction tlra t the showing of a specific fact
is prima facie evidence of guilt, or raises a presumption
of guilt, is inaccurate, as leading the jury to think that
proof of such a fact casts upon defendant the burden of
proving his innocence. State vs. Brady, 91 N. \V. 801
(Iowa 1902)
The State did not supply evidence necessary to connect appellant directly with the offense charged.
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State rs. Ha.rcombe, 7S Utah 89, 158 P. 1096;
State rs. Pomeroy, S3

l~tah

91, 38 P. 2d 751;

State rs. Petit, 97 lTtah -t.-t.:~, 93 P. 2d 75.

The State 1nust prove the
of Proof" as to eYery

ca~e

e~:-;ential

and bear the "Burden
element of the crime

throughout the trial.
Sta.te r~"·· Jlaunion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 5-t-2:
S'tate rs. J/ cCune, 1G rtah 170, 51 P. 818;
,-.,'tate rs. TVlzitely, 100

l~tah

1-t, 110 P. 2d 337;

Jlorrisson rs. California, 291 F. S. 82, 90, 54 S.
Ct. 2S1, 2S7;
State vs. Barretta, -!7lTtah 479, 155 P. 343.
(R. Tr. 16-121.)

POINT NlrJfBER lY
The court erred in compelling appellant on go on
trial on the charge of Being· an Habitual Criminal on
tlw grounds that the said Habitual Criminal Act of
lTtah is unconstitutional as \\Titten, construed and applied, being in violation of and denying appellant's Federal Constitutional right to ''Due Process of Law" by
laws of Utah and the Constitution of the State of Utah
In·

and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the l Tnited States Section one.
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ThP ::mid Habitual Criminal Statute reads as follows: '' \Vhoever ha~ bePn previous}~' twice convicted
of felonie~, sentenced and committed to any prison, shall,
upon convi<'tiou of a felony committed in this State ...
lw deemed to 1H• "\ 11 Habitual Criminal and shall be punIshed h~, iutpri:-;onln<>nt in the State Prison for a term not
less tlwn fifteen years.''

I
I
I
I

r:rhe Information and judgment in this case shows
that appellant was prosecuted, tried and convicted and
sentenced under the said Utah's Hahitual Criminal Statute for the offenses of four alleged previous convictions
of purported ''felonies'' in other states of Oregon,
California, X evacla and Idaho.
Appellant contends that this Utah Statute does not
In any way include any such alleged previous convictions of crimes in other states within its provisions but
is restricted as a matter of law to previous convictions
of felonies in the State of l'tah.
The said Habitual Criminal Statute is unconstitutional and void as applied in this case when appellant
was prosecuted for crimes alleged to have been committed in States other than Utah.
Although such previous convictions may have been
included in Utah's former 1-Iabitual Criminal Law, Utah
Code 1943 Section 103-1-18 because it read as far as
pertinent here as follows: '' \Vhoever has been previous}~· twice convicted of crime, sentenced and comrnitted to prison, in this or any other state, for terms of
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not le::-s than three years each, shall, upon conviction of
a felony committed in this state be deemed to be an
habitual criminal.'' But in 1951 the Legislature struck
out and abolished these provisions as to Crime and
Any Other State, completely from the 1943 Habitual
Criminal Statute and restricted the terms of Utah's
Habitual Crin1inal Statute to previous convictions of
felonie::- in the State of Utah.
Boyd Y~. Smyth, 200 Iowa 687, 205 N.W. 522,
43A.L.R. 137. Defendant in this case was tried
for receiving stolen property, the Supreme Court
in that case held: "It is settled law that, where
statutes are revised and some parts of the original are omitted, the parts omitted cannot be reYived b~- construction hut are considered annulled.'' 36 C:·c. 1080.
Prior to 1951 the Habitual Criminal Statute used the
,,·ord •' Crime'' which has a universal legal meaning,
hut our present statute as revised and re-enacted by
Chapter 77 Laws of Utah 1951 uses the purely local
statutory term "felonies". Under our statutory system
of law, there is no such thing as a universal commonlaw felon~-, which when it existed was an offense punishable by death. In these United Ntates the word "felony"
has no legal meaning; therefore in each and every state
it~ local legal meaning is defined in various ways by
state ~tatutes onl~T to classify those crimes committed
within each State's own jurisdiction and borders, and
like any other State Statutory creation, has no extraterritorial force, meaning or effect in Other States, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

I

on any acts committed beyond its borders. Therefore,
any alleg<>u offense, in order to be a ''felony'' under
any Utah Htatute, must be a crime within the borders
and jurisdiction of, under and against the laws of Utah;
and any alleged previous offense, of whatever local
name, in Other Htatt-~ and jurisdictions, do not qualify
as felonie8 under any law of the State of Utah.

I

In the instant case, the Supreme Courts of each of
the States in whieh the alleged previous convictions occurred, Hold that their Statutory "Felony" has no
meaning beyond their borders and jurisdiction.
In re Biggs, 52 Oregon 433, 97 P. 713. In
the absence of statute the term ''felony'' is not
descriptiYe of any offense.
In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452,
which cite California and Nevada cases: In re
Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P.2d 166.
Appellant subn1its that these decisions of other
states are binding on their statutes.
It n1ust be presumed that the Legislature meant to
change the Statute as it did, so that it novY applies only
to persons previously convicted of crimes termed
''felonies'' committed in and punishable in the State
of Utah.
If any Statute of any jurisdiction is meant to include any act in any of the Other States of the United
States within its terms, it must, in exact words, use the
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classical definition - ''Any Other State'' or any of
The State~ to include them, for otherwise, as here, the
~ta tute excludes them.
Twin Falls vs. Hulbert, 66 Idaho 128, 156
P.:2d 319, 66 S.Ct.444. The classical designation
to clearly indicate the ~tates as individual governinental entities 1naking up the United States
dating from the Constitution and coming down
through various Acts of Congress and pronouncenlent:s of the courts i~ the word '':-·Hates''.
A penal Statute can reach no further than
ib word~, no person can be made subject to them
by implication.
Appellant submits that it is necessary under the
well established principle of Criminal Law, that any
Statute must ~tate in direct words all that its terms
are meant to include, or be held Unconstitutional for
lack of ''X otice'' under the Due Process of Law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.

1

m·

it~

&1

In Conclusion, appellant submits that the alleged
previous conYictions of a number of purported '' felonies" in Other State:-;, are not within either the words
or legal meaning of Utah's Habitual Criminal Statute
and that a~ arbitrarily construed and applied again~t
the appellant by the State to convict and punish him
under it, that it violate~ in toto Federal Constitutional
Rigltb; to lawful "Notice" and to "Due Process of
Law"; and that thP said Habitual Criminal Statute hy
being ~o construed and applied is thereby ]aeking in lawSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ful "~ otice" a:-; written and 1~ Unconstitutional, Null
and void undPr the Law~ and Constitution of the State
ol' l !tah and tlw ''DUE PROCESS OF.., LAW" clause
of St>('tion One of tlH' Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and it should be so
Declared.
POINT NUMBER V
The court erred in permitting District Attorney over
objections of appellant to force appellant to testify
again:-;t himself and to incriminate himself and to furnish the evidence to convict himself on the untried case
of Being An Habitual Criminal while he was on trial
for Grand Larceny which i:::; contrary to and in violation of the Habitual Criminal Statute of the State of
Utah.
As far as pertinent here, the Habitual Criminal
Statute is as follows: ''The jury shall not be told of
the previous convictions of felony and the trial on the
felony committed within the State of Utah shall preceed
a:-; in other cases".
X ot only did this action of the State deprive appellant of his Constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury, Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 12
and Utah Code 1953 Section 77-1-8, but it also forced
appellant to testify against himself and furnish the
evidence against himself to convict him of the crime
of Being An Habitual Criminal before the jury· on the
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I

'[1

an

I'R

untried crune of Being an Habitual Criminal while he
''"a~

on trial I'Pr (;rand Larceny. It cannot be contended

that it

wa~

eross-examination on the charge of Being

An Habitual Cri1ninal for the reason that appellant
was at that ti1ne on trial for Grand Larceny.

(Tr.

1:21-143).

POINT

~U:MBER

YI

The court erred in denying appellant's l\Iotion in
~-\._rrest

fore

of J udg1nent filed and argued in this cause be-

~entence

\Yas passed or judgment entered against

appellant for the verdicts of the jury upon grounds
as stated in said motion, some of the grounds being,
that the court did not have jurisdiction of the offenses
charged in the Information or jurisdiction of the person of the appellant; that appellant \Hls denied a fair
trial as guaranteed

h~~

the Constitution of the United

~

Statt>::; Fourteenth Amendment Section one, Constitu-

~:

tion of Utah, Article 1, Section 12 and Utah Code 1953
Section 77-1-8.

And further that appellant was tried

and convicted upon four alleged and purported felonies
in

~aid

trial upon which he had theretofore been found

g-uiltr and

puni~d1Pd

as provided by law in eaeh of said

case;;;, therefore appellant was compelled to suffer double jeopardy in said cases which is eontrary to the
Statntp:-; of the State of Utah. (R. Tr. 191-192)
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POINT NUMBER VII
rrhe court erred in denying appellant'~ 2\Iotion for
a New Trial nmde upon the grounds of insufficiency of
the evidence introduced by the State to support the
verdict of thP jury; and also upon the grounds of errors
made by the court in its instructions to the .jury, and
errors made by the court in decisions of questions of
la ,,,, during the course of the trial and for acts done
and allowed by the court during the trial prejudicial
to the substantial righb of appellant. (R. Tr. 189)
On the Point of insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict of the jury, appellant refers to
his arguments in Point Xumber III to support his argument on that Point.
~\ppellant

excepted to court 'i' instruction two and
seven for the trial of Grand Larceny (R. Tr. 141), the
said instructions were prejudicial to appellant's rights
to a fair trial. Appellant especially objects to that part
of Instruction Number two, as follows: "That thereafter the defendant \Yas found in possession of the recently stolen goods and if you also find that the defendant failed to give a satisfactory explanation of his possession, there would arise an inference that the defendant conm1itted the larceny himself." (R. Tr. 171, 172)
Appellant contends that instruction as given
by the court was just the same as if the court had
instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty of
Grand Larceny.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tri

25
A~

to error~ committed h~· the court of questions
of law during trial and for art~ done and allowed by
the court during trial prejudicial to the substantial
rights of appellant, appellant refers to his argument
under Point~ II and Y to ~npport his argument on
those points. (R. Tr. 121-143).

POINT

NU~lBER

YIII

The eourt erred in the matter of not entering judgment against appellant and senteneing him for the crime
of grand larcen~· after the jury returned a verdict of
t,'liilty of Grand Larceny before he ~entenced appellant
for the crin1e of Being An Habitual Criminal.
It requires no quotation of authority to state without contradiction that no person can be punished and
imprisoned except a~ provided by statute in the State
of Utah.
lJ tah 's Habitual Criminal Statute provides that before a person can be found guilty of Being An Habitual
Criminal he must be convicted of a felony committed in
this state. ~\ppellant conten<1~ that the said conviction
for Grand Larceny was not complete until judgment had
been entered and appellant had been :-;entenced for the
crime of grand larceny. (R. rrr. 197)

Appellant further contend~ that the judgment entered
this cause against appellant l'or having been found
guilty of the crime of Being· .\n Habitual Criminal and
the sentence given that appellant serYP fifteen years in
the StatP Prison for said crime are null and void for
111
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the reason that they are not based upon law and that
they should be i'Pi aside and the appellant discharged.
The trial court showed that it rejected and refused
to consider the verdict of the jury which found appellant guilty of the erime of Grand Larceny when the
court dn·w a line through the words ''Grand Larceny''
contained in Certificate of Probable Cause and scratched
those words out of said Certificate together with the
letter "s" in word t-rimes contained in the said Certificate filed in this cause. (Tr. 199)
Front a consideration of the entire proceedings, it
1s n1anifest, I submit that the trial court erred in the
respects herein pointed out and that the judgments of
conviction should be reversed, and the case remanded
to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the case
and discharge the appellant.
Respectfully submittea,

R. R. HACKETT,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant.
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